2023 Elections Lack Transparency—European Union Election Observers

2023 Elections Lack Transparency

OpenLife Nigeria reproduces a preliminary statement of the EU election observation mission (EU EOM) has been delivered before the completion of the entire electoral process.  However,  the EU EOM examines critical flaws in the election which have undermined a transparent process, promising to publish a final report, including full analysis and recommendations for electoral reform.

On 25 February, Nigerians went to the polls in highly anticipated presidential and National Assembly
elections that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) kept on schedule despite a volatile
and challenging environment. Fundamental freedoms of assembly and movement were largely respected,
yet the full enjoyment of the latter was impeded by insufficient planning, insecurity and the prevailing
Naira and fuel shortages. Abuse of incumbency by various political office holders distorted the playing
field and there were widespread allegations of vote buying. Media provided an extensive coverage of the
three leading campaigns, while disinformation interfered with voters’ right to make an informed choice
on election day. The EU EOM is continuing its observation of the ongoing collation and tabulation of
results throughout the country.
INEC’s operational capacity was hampered by the ongoing fuel and Naira shortage. Insecurity prevented
it from accessing some Local Government Areas (LGAs), notably in the South. Attacks on INEC premises,
including just days before polling, hindered preparations in affected areas, while instilling fear in voters.
Overall, stakeholders had expressed confidence in INEC’s independence, professionalism, and voter
information efforts, but this decreased ahead of elections. INEC lacked efficient planning and transparency
during critical stages of the electoral process, while on election day trust in INEC was seen to further
reduce due to delayed polling processes and information gaps related to much anticipated access to results
on its Results Viewing Portal (IReV).
In the lead-up to elections, the widely welcomed Electoral Act 2022 introduced measures aimed at
building stakeholder trust, however leaving some important gaps in terms of accountability and INEC’s
power to enforce the law. Weak points include a lack of INEC empowerment to enforce sanctions for
electoral offences and breaches of campaign finance rules. Positively, INEC benefited from more timely
financing than for previous contests. Other new provisions also aimed to enhance transparency of results.
The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the IReV for the 2023 elections
was perceived as an important step to ensure the integrity and credibility of elections. However, delayed
training of technical personnel, an inadequate mock testing exercise, and a lack of public information on
the election technologies diminished expectations and left room for speculation and uncertainty.
During the early stages of collation, presidential result forms from polling units were not displayed on the
IReV, while Senate and House of Representative results were slowly published. Presidential election result
forms started to be uploaded after 10 pm on election day, raising concerns and reaching only 20 per cent by noon on 26 February. Later the same evening, INEC explained the delay with “technical hitches.”
Among 93.4 million registered voters, 9.5 million additional voters were registered ahead of the 2023
polls, of whom two-thirds were youth following mobilisation efforts during the registration period. Yet,
the collection of permanent voter cards (PVC), a requirement to vote, was negatively affected by poor
institutional planning. Two days before elections, INEC stated that 93.3 per cent of PVCs were collected.
Without an independent audit of the voter register, quality and inclusiveness could not be assured.
Following contentious candidate registration processes there were18 contestants for the presidential office
and over 4200 for 461 national assembly seats. They were selected in party primaries that reportedly
lacked transparency and inclusiveness, marked by very chronically low levels of participation of women
and youth. This compounded an overall stark lack of legal measures for inclusion and barriers to
participation which do not align with international standards.
The conduct of contesting parties and candidates, as well as some gaps in the law, led to a spate of preelection court cases, with some matters not finalised ahead of elections. During the pre-election period,
EU EOM interlocutors criticised various court rulings for being too technical, some leading to belated
primary re-runs, others to substitutions of perceived legitimate candidates, thereby eroding public trust,
exposing intra-party conflicts, and contributing to a volatile campaign environment.
The campaign was highly competitive, and contestants conducted rallies nationwide, but the Naira cash
and fuel scarcity reduced activities and attendance. Political parties denounced unequal campaign
conditions due to interference of opponent governors. Reports of vote and PVC buying were also frequent.
Internal party conflicts weakened the presidential campaigns of PDP and APC with personal accusation
obscuring issue-based messages shortly before the elections. There was a lack of prosecution of electoral
offences and a significant increase in violent incidents closer to elections, including attacks on candidates,
reportedly, aimed to disturb the elections and suppress voter participation, particularly in the South-East.
Media offered an extensive campaign coverage, despite economic hardships, institutional pressures, and
electoral violence. Prime-time newscasts focused on the Naira swap, and APC and PDP animosities,
granting both parties equitable exposure, although mostly negative in tone. Politicians used polarising
rhetoric on air and conspiracy theories, originating online, were frequently discussed in the most popular
talk shows. Analytical reporting on party policies was scant. Lead contestants could not be compared
directly, as APC and PDP rebuffed presidential debates, undermining voters’ right to an informed choice.
Social media was actively used by political actors as a campaign tool. However, the platforms were
misused to spread harmful content, including disinformation on key electoral processes; the measures the
platforms took to protect electoral integrity were insufficient. Misleading information also came from
political actors and contributed to a blurred information environment for voters.
Online and offline media joined forces with civil society and fact checkers to safeguard the integrity of
the pre-election information environment. Real-time fact checking of gubernatorial and other contestants’
debates strived to hold candidates accountable, while various formats of voter information, raised voter
awareness and helped to counter electoral insecurity, complementing INEC efforts.
Civil society organisations observed and scrutinised different aspects of the election, issued several preelection reports, at times probing INEC’s operational preparedness, offering voters a non-partisan
assessment of election preparations. Over 144,800 citizen observers monitored election day proceedings.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) has been present in Nigeria since 11 January 2023
following an invitation from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The Mission is led by Chief
Observer, Barry Andrews, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) (Ireland). In total, the EU EOM deployed
110 observers from 25 EU Member States, Canada, Norway and Switzerland across the country to assess the whole
electoral process against international obligations and commitments for democratic elections as well as the laws of
Nigeria. A delegation of the European Parliament, headed by Evin Incir, MEP (Sweden), also joined the mission
and fully endorses this Statement. On election day, observers visited over 240 polling units in 24 of the 36 states and
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Nigeria to observe voting and counting. This preliminary statement is
delivered prior to the completion of the election process. The final assessment of the elections will depend also on
the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, in particular the tabulation of results, and the handling
of possible post-election day complaints and appeals. The EU EOM remains in country to observe post-election
developments and will publish a final report containing detailed recommendations within two months of the
conclusion of the electoral process. The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions and adheres to the
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, endorsed at the United Nations in October 2005.